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Abstract
We study the evolution of the distribution of assets in a deterministic version
of the Neoclassical Growth Model with log-utility, a minimum consumption
requirement, and Cobb-Douglas technology. Agents are heterogeneous in
their initial endowment of assets only. The dynamics of the aggregate vari-
ables behaves as in a standard representative agent model. We prove that
the disparity in assets decreases monotonically in a transition to the steady
state from below, as long as (i) the minimum consumption requirement is
zero or negative, or (ii) the consumption requirement is positive but not too
large and the initial capital stock is large enough. This result is not based
on a local approximation of the model around the steady state, nor on nu-
merical computations, as it has been the case in previous literature. We also
show how a positive minimum consumption requirement or a small elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor can generate non-monotonic paths
for the disparity in assets along a transition. Our work extends the result
in Chatterjee (1994) on the evolution of the distribution of lifetime wealth
(or consumption) to the evolution of the distribution of assets (or capital).
11 Introduction
In this paper we study the evolution of the distribution of assets in a de-
terministic version of the Neoclassical Growth Model with discrete time,
log-utility, and Cobb-Douglas technology. This very speciﬁcf r a m e w o r kh a s
been so widely used in Macro theory that one could think that its dynamics
is already well understood. However, this is not the case. As long as the
depreciation rate is less than one, there is no analytical solution for the main
variables outside the steady state. We know that optimal sequences for cap-
ital and consumption exist, that they satisfy a set of ﬁrst order conditions,
and that they converge to their steady state values. But we don’t know
much about the rates at which these variables converge.
These rates of convergence are key to determine what happens to the evo-
lution of assets along the transition path to the steady state. We consider
a decentralized economy with a continuum of agents diﬀering only in their
initial level of assets or capital. Labor supply is inelastic and equal to one in
each period. Preferences are also equal among agents, and represented by
a log-utility function with a minimum consumption requirement. The con-
sumption requirement is a parameter which could be positive, zero (as in the
standard case) or even negative. A negative requirement can be interpreted
as a lump sum transfer from outside the model.
In this framework, we analyze the evolution of the disparity in assets along
a transition to the steady state from below, this is, starting with an ini-
tial aggregate stock of capital below its steady state value. We ﬁnd that
this evolution crucially depends on how fast capital grows compared to con-
sumption. The intuition is that asset accumulation depends on the balance
between the desired rate of growth of consumption and the rate of growth of
the lifetime wealth portfolio, which includes assets as well as labor income.
But the latter depends on the relative rate of growth of factor prices, which
is determined by the rate of growth of the aggregate capital stock.
To be more speciﬁc, the faster capital converges to the steady state, the
faster wages increase and the rate of return of capital decreases. Hence,
the labor component of the wealth portfolio grows faster than the asset
component. If capital grows fast enough, poor agents (for whom wealth
portfolio includes more labor than assets) will accumulate assets at a faster
r a t et om a t c ht h ed e s i r e dr a t eo fg r o w t ho fc o n s u m p t i o n . A sar e s u l t ,t h e
disparity in assets decreases over time, even though the disparity in lifetime
wealth might remain constant or even increase.
2Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h e nr e l a t e dt ot h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fc a p i t a l .I nT h e o r e m
3 we prove that, as long as (i) the minimum consumption requirement is
zero or negative, or (ii) the consumption requirement is positive but not
too large and the initial capital stock is large enough, the product of the
discount factor times the interest rate factor (this is, the rate of growth of
consumption) represents a lower bound for the rate of growth of capital. The
result holds in a range of initial conditions for aggregate capital, but it is not
b a s e do nal o c a la p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h em o d e la r o u n dt h es t e a d ys t a t e .A sa n
implication of this result, Theorem 4 shows that under the same conditions
the disparity in assets monotonically decreases in a transition from below.
We also provide numerical simulations to illustrate some interesting cases
in which the assumptions required for Theorems 3 and 4 do not hold. We
show that when the minimum consumption requirement is large, or when
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (in a CES production
function) is less than a half, the evolution of the disparity in assets is increas-
ing. In between -when the minimum consumption requirement is positive
but not too large or when the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor lies between a half and one- the dynamics of the distribution of assets
is non-monotonic: the disparity increases ﬁrst and decreases as the economy
approaches its steady state, displaying the so-called Kuznets curve.
Our work builds on the original investigation by Chatterjee (1984) who stud-
ies the dynamics of the distribution of lifetime wealth along the transition to
the steady state in a similar economy.1 He states conditions under which the
distribution of assets does not aﬀect the dynamics of aggregate consumption
and capital, and characterizes the eﬀects of this dynamics on the distribution
of lifetime wealth. In particular, he showed that wealth inequality mono-
tonically increases (decreases) during a transition to the steady state from
below depending on whether agents face a positive (negative) consumption
requirement, and that inequality in lifetime wealth remains constant if the
consumption requirement is equal to zero. Unlike Chatterjee, we focus on
the disparity of assets (or capital) instead of the disparity in lifetime wealth
(or consumption).
Caselli and Ventura (2000) use a continuous time model and study the dy-
namics of the distribution of consumption, assets and income in an economy
where agents potentially diﬀer in their tastes for a publicly provided con-
sumption good and in their ability to work in addition to their initial assets.
1Stiglitz (1969) studies similar issues in a continuous time model and assuming several
ad hoc saving functions. He also stated conditions for non monotonic dynamics in a
transition towards the steady state.
3They provide a variety of examples with monotonic and non monotonic dy-
namics for inequality in the distribution of assets. For instance, the authors
show that with log utility, no transfers of public goods, and a Cobb-Douglas
technology, inequality monotonically decreases in a transition from below.
They also show that this result may be reversed if the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor in the production side of the economy is
smaller than one and that the evolution of inequality may display a Kuznets
curve if agents are suﬃciently patient. We make similar points in a discrete
time model using a very diﬀerent set of techniques.
Finally, ´ Alvarez and D´ ıaz (2001) compute the evolution of the distribution
of assets in a framework similar to ours, but using a more general CARA
utility function. They ﬁnd that inequality decreases as long as the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is low (which includes the log case) and the
minimum consumption requirement is also low. For other cases, they sim-
ulate interesting cases of non-monotonic Kuznets-like paths for inequality,
which they calibrate to reproduce the evolution of asset disparity in the U.S.
economy. Again, some of their results are similar to ours, but we prove the
monotonicity of inequality instead of relying on numerical computations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model economy
and deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium. In Section 2 we introduce the plan-
ner’s problem and summarize what is known about its solution. Our result
on the rate of growth of capital is obtained and discussed in Section 3, while
in Section 4 we use this result to prove our main result on the evolution of
the disparity in assets. In section 5, we provide some numerical simulations
to illustrate some interesting cases where the assumptions required for the
previous results do not hold. Finally, we conclude.
2T h e M o d e l
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of agents which we index by
i ∈ [0,1]. Each of these agents behaves so as to maximize the present value of




where β ∈ (0,1) is the common subjective discount factor. We assume
that u(ci
t) = log(ci
t − ¯ c), where ¯ c is a real number not necessarily equal to
zero. Agents diﬀer only in their initial endowment of assets, denoted ai
0.2
2We think of individual portfolios of assets as including mainly capital, and probably,
one period bonds. Our analysis remains unchanged if we include any other asset in zero
net supply as long as, in equilibrium, all assets oﬀer the same net rate of return.
4In addition, each agent is endowed with a unit of time in the beginning of
each period, which they inelastically supply as labor.
In the production side of the economy there is a representative ﬁrm. This
ﬁrm produces the consumption/investment good combining units of capital
and labor with the following Cobb-Douglas technology: Yt = Kα
t N1−α
t +(1−
δ)Kt,w i t hα ∈ (0,1), and where Yt, Kt and Nt stand for aggregate output,
capital and labor in period t,a n dw h e r eδ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate.
The ﬁrm chooses capital and labor to maximize the proﬁts in each period:
Yt − KtRt − wtNt,w h e r eRt and wt are the interest rate and wage rate,
respectively. Markets for output, capital and labor are competitive.
2.1 Agents’ optimal choice




t − ¯ c)
s. to ci
t + ai
t+1 = wt + Rtai
t,
ci
t ≥ max{0,¯ c}, ∀t ≥ 0, given ai
0.
(1)
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for an interior solution are given by the
Euler equation:
ci
t+1 − ¯ c
ci
t − ¯ c
= βRt+1, (2)
the budget constraint, and the usual transversality condition.3
In what follows we characterize paths for consumption and assets of an
agent i given his initial stock of assets and a sequence of prices {Rt,w t}.














Repeated substitutions of Equation (2) in the budget constraint and the use
of the previous deﬁnition provides the following expression for an agent’s
consumption in period t:
ci
t =( 1− β)ωi
t + ¯ Bt, (4)
3Notice that we write the Euler equation with equality. Therefore, we are implicitly
assuming that there is a borrowing limit suﬃciently generous such that agents never ﬁnd
optimal to exhaust it. See Hern´ andez (1991) for a study of aggregate dynamics with
borrowing constraints.






It follows from the previous expression that consumption is linear in lifetime
wealth. In other words, Engel curves are linear. Inserting the expression for
consumption in the budget constraint in period t, and using the deﬁnition
of ωi
t,w eg e t :
ai
t+1 = βRtai
t + Dt,∀t ≥ 0, (5)
with the sequence Dt deﬁned as:







Notice that Dt is independent of i. The equation in expression (5) will be
useful to characterize the evolution of the disparity in assets in a transition
to the steady state.
2.2 Firm’s problem
We write the representative ﬁrm’s problem as follows:
max Yt − RtKt − wtNt
s. to Yt = Kα
t N1−α
t +( 1− δ)Kt.
(6)
The ﬁrst order conditions for optimality equate wages to the marginal prod-
uct of labor and the interest rate to the marginal product of capital: wt =
(1 − α)Kα
t N−α
t ,a n dRt = αKα−1
t N1−α
t +( 1− δ).
2.3 Competitive equilibrium
We are interested in the competitive evolution of the distribution of assets.
The following deﬁnition introduces a notion of competitive equilibrium for
the economy.
Deﬁnition 1: A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a list of sequences
for individual consumptions and assets {ci
t,a i
t} and a sequence of prices
{Rt,w t} such that: 1) {ci
t,a i
t} solve the problem in (1) for each agent i tak-
ing {Rt,w t} as given; 2) prices are competitive: Rt = αKα−1
t N1−α
t +(1−δ)
and wt =( 1− α)Kα
t N−α
t ; 3) markets clear: Kt =
R 1
0 ai
tdi,a n dNt =1 .
6Notice that Deﬁnition 1 implies market clearing for the output good.4 With
this deﬁnition in place, to study the evolution of asset’s holdings we only
need to characterize the evolution of equilibrium prices. As shown in Chat-
terjee (1994), linear Engel curves provide an aggregation result so that equi-
librium prices for the economy depend only on the aggregate stock of capital
but not on its distribution over agents. This observation is useful in the con-
text of a competitive economy because it implies that equilibrium prices can
be recovered from the optimal allocation of a planner’s problem. In particu-
lar, the planner solves an optimization problem where there is a single agent
whose initial endowment of capital corresponds to the average initial capital
of the market economy. We study this planner’s problem in the next section.
3 The Planner’s Problem
The social planner solves the following problem
max{ct,kt+1}
P∞
t=0 βtlog(ct − ¯ c)
s. to ct + kt+1 = kα
t +( 1− δ)kt
ct ≥ max{0,¯ c},k t+1 ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, given k0.
(7)
To study the properties of a solution to the previous problem it is convenient




s. to ˜ ct +¯ c + kt+1 = kα
t +( 1− δ)kt
˜ ct ≥ 0,k t+1 ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, given k0.
(8)





t+1 +( 1− δ)], (9)
˜ ct = kα
t +( 1− δ)kt − kt+1 − ¯ c, (10)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ βt (kt+1/(˜ ct +¯ c)) = 0. Inspection
of (10) suggests that a solution may fail to exist if ¯ c is an arbitrarily large
4If one period bonds or other assets in zero net supply are explicitly included in the
model, then the corresponding market-clearing conditions for those assets have to be added
in the previous deﬁnition.
7number and/or if the initial capital is too small. Thus, before we proceed








We deﬁne ¯ cmax ≡ (k∗)α−δk∗.I f¯ c>0, then we also deﬁne ˆ k as the smallest
solution of ¯ c−kα+δk =0 .T h ed e ﬁnition of ¯ cmax ensures that the previous
equation has two solutions when 0 < ¯ c<¯ cmax.F i n a l l y ,w ed e ﬁne
kmin =
(
0i f ¯ c ≤ 0
ˆ k if ¯ c>0
Throughout the analysis we will assume that the following assumption is
satisﬁed:
A1: ¯ c<¯ cmax and k0 >k min.
Assumption A1 will be discussed in detail after we introduce Theorems 1
and 2. Under this assumption, the planner’s problem in (8) is a version of
the neoclassical growth model. Theorem 1 summarizes common knowledge
about this problem and thus is stated without proof.5
Theorem 1. Consider the problem in (8) and assume A1. Then,
i) there exists a solution {˜ ct,k t};
ii) the solution {kt} can be represented by a continuous, non decreasing and
strictly concave decision rule g which delivers kt+1 = g(kt);
iii) the decision rule g is such that k∗ = g(k∗), for a steady state level of
capital k∗ as given in (11);
iv) for all k0 <k ∗, the solution {kt} converges monotonically to k∗, kt+1 >k t
and kt+1/kt >k t+2/kt+1, ∀t. Moreover, also {˜ ct} converges monotonically
to ˜ c∗ =( k∗)α − δk∗ − ¯ c.
Theorem 2 is a version of the welfare theorems and states the relation be-
tween the solution to the planner’s problem and the competitive equilibrium.
We also omit the proof.
5T h ec a s eo f¯ c = 0 is studied, for instance, in Harris (1987, Theorem 2.6, pag. 43).
Notice that in Theorem 1 we are assuming that the solution to the planner’s problem in
sequence form and in its recursive formulation is the same. Although this is not obvious
because the utility function is unbounded, the arguments to prove Theorem 1 in Huggett
(1991) in a similar case and Theorem 4.3 In Stokey and Lucas (1989) can be invoked to
show that in our particular application both solutions coincide.
8Theorem 2. Let {˜ ct,k t} be the solution to the planner’s problem (7), and
{ci
t,a i
t;Rt,w t} be competitive equilibrium allocations and prices satisfying
Deﬁnition 1. Then, the following equivalences hold: ˜ ct =
R 1
0 ci
tdi − ¯ c, kt =
R 1
0 ai
tdi, Rt = α(kt)α−1 +( 1− δ),a n dwt =( 1− α)kα
t .
Discussion of A1
1. Assumption A1 is necessary to ensure that a stationary solution exists
to the problem (8). Since k∗ is independent of ¯ c,w ea r ea l l o w e dt ou s et h e
feasibility constraint to ask what is the largest ¯ c that would deliver ˜ ct =0
if kt = k∗ = kt+1.T h e a n s w e r i s ¯ cmax.T h u s , i f ¯ c<¯ cmax then ˜ ct > 0
when kt = k∗. However, ˜ ct can be strictly positive for all kt > 0 only when
k0 >k min.T h i si sd i s c u s s e dn e x t .
2. kmin is the smallest amount of capital that could be sustained without
violating ˜ c0 ≥ 0. It is straightforward to check that if 0 < ¯ c<¯ cmax,t h e n
0 <k min <k ∗. Thus, A1 guarantees that it is always possible to at least
keep the stock of capital and still have ˜ ct > 0i na l lp e r i o d s .
3. Without imposing A1, problem (8) may have some other interesting
solutions. To see this, notice that if ¯ c is unrestricted, then equation ¯ c −
kα + δk = 0 may have no solution, or up to two, when ¯ c>0. Assume
for a moment that ¯ c>0a n ds u ﬃciently large so that ¯ c − kα + δk =0
has only one solution. It follows by construction that α(ˆ k)α−1 +( 1− δ) <
α(k∗)α−1+(1−δ), thus, ˆ k>k ∗.C h o o s i n gk0 = ˆ k,t h e n˜ ct = 0 and kt = ˆ k in
all periods, i.e., there exists a degenerate steady state. If we reduce slightly
the value of ¯ c, then the equation would admit two solutions, but still ˆ k>k ∗.
Choosing k0 > ˆ k in this case will produce ˜ ct > 0a n dkt > ˆ k in all periods,
and a steady state fails to exist.
W ec a l lt h es o l u t i o ni nT h e o r e m1(iv) at r a n s i t i o nf r o mb e l o w . T h ee v o -
lution of asset holdings over this transition is the main focus of the paper.
In the following section we develop a number of results that will help us to
describe the evolution of the distribution of assets, which is accomplished in
Section 5.
4 A Lower Bound for the Rate of Growth of Cap-
ital
Before we continue with the analysis, we deﬁne some auxiliary variables and
functions, and we introduce assumption A2 for future reference. We deﬁne
9the sequence {zt} as
zt ≡ kt/˜ ct−1.
We also deﬁne the function φ :[ kmin,k∗] → R by
φ(k) ≡
αβkα + β(1 − δ)k
(1 − αβ)kα +( 1− β)(1 − δ)k − ¯ c
,
and the function ϕ :[ kmin,k∗] → R by
ϕ(k) ≡
(1 − δ)kα(1 − α)2
α2kα−1 +( 1− δ)
.
It is straightforward to show that ϕ is increasing in k.L e t¯ co = ϕ(k∗) > 0.
Also, if ¯ c>0w ed e n o t eb yko the solution to (1−αβ)kα+(1−β)(1−δ)k−¯ c =
0, and by ˆ ko the solution to ϕ(k)=¯ c.






1. If ¯ c ≤ 0 then the function φ is well deﬁned and positive for all k>0.
However, if ¯ c>0 then the denominator of φ equals zero for kt = ko.T o
ensure φ > 0 along the transition from below, we impose k0 >k o. Notice
that ko <k ∗, as required in a transition from below. To see that this is
the case, we use the deﬁnition of ¯ cmax and the fact that 0 < ¯ c<¯ cmax,
to obtain (1 − αβ)(ko)α +( 1− β)(1 − δ)ko < (k∗)α − δk∗. Assuming that
ko ≥ k∗, it follows from the previous inequality that (k∗)1−α < αβ/(1 −
β(1 − δ)), which is a contradiction. Similarly, ko >k min,s i n c eb yd e ﬁnition
(1−αβ)(ko)α+(1−β)(1−δ)ko =( kmin)α−δkmin,s oko ≤ kmin implies that
(kmin)1−α ≥ αβ/(1 − β(1 − δ)) = (k∗)1−α, another contradiction. Finally,
¯ c<¯ co implies ˆ ko <k ∗, as required, since ϕ is strictly increasing.
2. The assumption that ¯ c<¯ co and k0 > ˆ ko implies that ϕ(k) > ¯ c in
a transition from below, since ϕ(ˆ ko)=¯ c and ϕ is strictly increasing. This
result will be used in the proof of Lemma 1. Now we would like only to point
out that, without further assumptions, ¯ co c o u l db el a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a n
¯ cmax. To see this, assume for a moment that ¯ co > ¯ cmax for all possible α, β
and δ.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of k∗ in Equation (11), we obtain (2 − δ)β[α +
β(1 −δ)(1− α)] > 1. The previous inequality is violated for any α and δ in
(0,1) if β is selected arbitrarily small. Therefore there are conﬁgurations for
α, β and δ for which ¯ co < ¯ cmax. This case receives more attention below.
Finally, ˆ ko c o u l db el a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nko.
10Under assumptions A1 and A2, we prove some useful properties of φ and
{zt}, which we collect as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below, φ(kt+1) >







zt − 1( 1 2 )
Proof: see Appendix.
Having established the monotonicity of φ, we next show that the sequence
{zt} is monotonic and strictly increasing. This is done in Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below zt+1 ≤ zt
implies zt+2 <z t+1.
Proof: We proceed by contradiction, so suppose there exists a period t ≥ 1




zt − 1, and reordering:
zt ≤ φ(kt), (13)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tφ(kt) > 0. Proceeding in the same way
with zt+2 ≥ zt+1, we obtain zt+1 ≥ φ(kt+1). Therefore, since zt+1 ≤ zt,( 1 3 )
implies φ(kt) ≥ φ(kt+1), a contradiction with Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below, zt+1 ≤ zt
implies zt+j+1 <z t+j for all j>1.
Proof: Apply recursively Lemma 2 for j =1 ,2,...
Lemma 3. Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below, for each
period t there exists j ≥ 0 such that zt+j+1 >z t+j.
Proof: Suppose otherwise, so that there exists a period t for which zt+j+1 <
zt+j, for all j ≥ 0 . U s i n gas i m i l a ra r g u m e n ta si nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a2 ,
this implies
zt+j < φ(kt+j)( 1 4 )
for all j ≥ 0. But this is a contradiction, since {zt+j} is monotonically
decreasing by assumption, {φ(kt+j)} is monotonically increasing by Lemma
1, and both sides converge to the same steady state value k∗/˜ c∗.
The next theorem introduces a new result. We show that the product βRt
r e p r e s e n t sal o w e rb o u n df o rt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fc a p i t a l .T h i sb o u n dw i l l
be key to characterize the evolution of prices in any transition from below.
11Theorem 3. Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below, kt+1/kt >
βRt, ∀t.
Proof: Suppose kt+1/kt ≤ βRt = β
h
αkα−1
t +( 1− δ)
i
for some period t.
Then, (9) implies zt+1 ≤ zt. It follows from Corollary 1 that zt+j+1 <z t+j
for all j>1, but this contradicts Lemma 3.
With the previous result at hand we are ready to study the evolution of the
distribution of assets.
5 The Dynamics of the Distribution of Assets
We use the coeﬃcient of variation (standard deviation over the mean) to
measure disparity in assets. The following theorem is the main result of the
paper.
Theorem 4: Assume A1 and A2. In any transition from below, the dispar-
ity in assets monotonically decreases over time.















The proof is concluded since Theorem 3 implies (kt/kt+1)βRt < 1.
Comments
1. Theorem 4 says that along a transition to the steady state from below,
poor agents accumulate assets at a faster rate than rich agents, and thus
the distribution of assets becomes more equal over time. In particular, the
result holds for all 0 <k t <k ∗ when ¯ c ≤ 0. It also holds for ¯ c>0i n
t h er a g es p e c i ﬁed in A2 once the stock of capital is suﬃciently close to k∗.
This result has to be contrasted with Theorem 1 in Chatterjee (1994). He
shows that under the same assumptions, if kt <k ∗, then inequality in the
distribution of lifetime wealth: 1) declines when ¯ c<0; 2) it remains constant
when ¯ c = 0; and 3) it increases when ¯ c>0.
2. ´ Alvarez and D´ ıaz (2001) use Lorenz-dominance as a measure of inequality
in assets in a model similar to ours. Their Proposition 1 provides suﬃcient
conditions under which the distribution of assets becomes more egalitarian
12over the transition to the steady state. Our Theorem 4 shows that their con-
ditions are always satisﬁed for the log utility and Cobb-Douglas technology
studied in this paper, provided that assumption A2 holds.
3. The results in Theorems 3 and 4 will follow as long as φ0(k) > 0. This is
the only step in our analysis in which we have used the Cobb-Douglas spec-
iﬁcation for the production function. Under a more general speciﬁcation,
φ(k)=
β[f0(k)k +( 1− δ)k]
f(k) − βf0(k)k +( 1− β)(1 − δ)k
,
where f denotes the production function per unit of labor. Could we still
show that φ0(k) > 0 using a more general technology? Consider for example
a CES production function f(k)=[ αk−ρ +( 1− α)]−1/ρ, with capital share
α ∈ (0,1) and −1 < ρ 6=0 ,w h e r e1 /1+ρ measures the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor. The Cobb-Douglas case corresponds to
the limit when ρ → 0. Assume for simplicity that ¯ c = 0 (similar results can
be obtained in the other cases). We can show that
φ0(k)M2
β




where M = h(k) − βf0(k)+( 1− β)(1 − δ)a n dh(k)=( α +( 1− α)kρ)−1/ρ.
To derive the previous expression, we use the fact that f(k)=h(k)k.S i n c e
h0(k) < 0 for all k ≥ 0, to obtain φ0(k) ≤ 0i ts u ﬃces to have h00(k) ≤
0. Using the previous notation, we obtain: h00(k)=h0(k)/k(α(ρ − 1) −
2(1 − α)kρ)/(α +( 1− α)kρ), thus φ0(k) ≤ 0 for all k ≤ (α(ρ − 1)/(2 −
2α))1/ρ = ˜ k.T h i si so n l yp o s s i b l ei fρ > 1, i.e., if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is less than 1/2, ruling out the Cobb-Douglas case.
With ρ > 1, it follows that for k∗ > ˜ k>k 0 > 0 inequality may initially
increase, but as soon as kt > ˜ k our result holds and inequality monotonically
decreases. A similar result was obtained by Caselli and Ventura (2000) in a
continuous time version of the model.
6 Simulations
In this section we numerically solve the model and provide several examples
illustrating the content of Theorem 4. We also simulate the economy for
c a s e si nw h i c ht h ea s s u m p t i o n sr e q u i r e df o rT h e o r e m s3a n d4d on o th o l d .
The parameter values used in all simulations are as follows: β = .99, α = .36,
and δ = .025. These values are standard in quantitative studies simulating
13quarterly data for the U.S. economy (see, for instance, the studies in Cooley
( 1 9 9 5 ) ) . T h em e t h o du s e dt os o l v et h em o d e li se x p l a i n e di nd e t a i li nt h e
Appendix, and in the following ﬁgures, we display the evolution over the
ﬁrst 100 periods.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the coeﬃcient of variation over the tran-
sition to the steady state for ¯ c = .1,¯ c =0a n d¯ c = −.1. These values for
¯ c, and the assumed initial condition for capital, satisfy the assumption of
Theorems 3 and 4. The ﬁgure reveals that the reduction in inequality is
larger when ¯ c = −.1. For completeness, Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the
saving rate, deﬁned as 1−ct/kα
t .T h i sﬁgure is interesting because it reveals
that: 1) the saving rate is monotonically decreasing all over the transition,
and 2), there are no substantial diﬀerences among the three cases in the
dynamics of the saving rate (slightly larger for low levels of capital when
¯ c = −.1).
Figures 3 and 4 display respectively the dynamics of inequality and of
the saving rate, for ¯ co < ¯ c<¯ cmax,t h u si nt h i sc a s ea s s u m p t i o nA 2i s
violated.6 Clearly, inequality is monotonically increasing, and displays a
convex-concave pattern.
Figures 5 and 6 display again the dynamics of inequality and of the saving
rate for a case where ¯ c satisﬁes assumption A2, but where the initial stock
of capital does not: k0 <k o < ˆ ko. In this example inequality ﬁrst increases
and then declines towards the steady state, displaying the so-called Kuznets
curve.
An interesting regularity of the previous examples is that the dynamics of the
saving rate parallels the evolution of inequality. In our last example we show
that with a CES production function with ρ > 1t h i sd o e sn o tn e e dt ob e
the case. Figures 7 and 8 show the evolution of inequality and of the saving
rate assuming ¯ c =0a n dt h a tρ =1 .1. In this case inequality displays non
monotonic dynamics, but the saving rate monotonically decreases towards
the steady state.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use a text-book version of the Neoclassical Growth Model
in discrete time to study asset distribution dynamics. In particular, we state
6Notice that when ¯ c
o < ¯ c, Remark 1 after assumption A2 implies that any k0 <k
∗
also violates A2.
14conditions in terms of minimum consumption requirements and aggregate
stock of capital under which inequality monotonically decreases over the
transition to the steady state. We extend our theoretical results with nu-
merical examples showing that a rich class of non monotonic dynamics is
also possible.
An interesting extension for this research is to provide suﬃcient conditions
under which the savings rate monotonically decreases in a transition. The
numerical examples show a clear relation between the evolution of the dispar-
ity in assets and the savings rate. Our intuition is that the same assumptions
leading to a monotonic asset disparity also lead to a monotonic savings rate.
To the extent of our knowledge, a formal proof of this statement (at least
in discrete time) remains to be provided.
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16A Appendix




(1 − δ)kα(1 − α)2 − ¯ c
£
α2kα−1 +( 1− δ)
¤ª
[(1 − αβ)kα +( 1− β)(1 − δ)k − ¯ c]2 > 0.
Thus, the result follows because in a transition from below kt <k t+1.F o r
t h ec a s eo f¯ c>0, notice that φ0(k) > 0i fa n do n l yi fϕ(k) > ¯ c,s ot h e
result follows from A2 (see Remark 2 after this assumption). The limit
limj→∞φ(kt+j)i so b t a i n e df r o m :
φ(k∗)=
αβ(k∗)α−1 + β(1 − δ)
(1 − αβ)(k∗)α−1 +(1− β)(1 − δ) − ¯ c/k∗
=









αβ − δ − ¯ c/k∗
=
1
(k∗)α−1 − δ − ¯ c/k∗ =
k∗
˜ c∗ ,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnitions of k∗ and ˜ c∗ from Theorem 1. To see the








t +( 1− δ)
i
zt+1. (16)




























which gives us the expression in (12), as desired.
17Numerical method
The numerical method we use for the simulations is based on dynamic
programming. We deﬁne the correspondence Γ(k)={(c,k0):c + k0 =
kα +( 1− δ)k,c ≥ max{0,¯ c},k0 ≥ 0}, and starting from an arbitrary (dif-
ferentiable, increasing and concave) function v0 of the state k,w ed e ﬁne a
mapping T as
(Tv)(k)=m a xc,k0∈Γ(k) log(ct − ¯ c)+βv0(k0),
and successive mappings Tn as T1v = Tv, T2v = T(Tv)... The ﬁrst order
condition implicit in the n-mapping is given by:
1
kα +( 1− δ)k − k0 − ¯ c
= βTn−1v0
0(k0). (18)
We compute 1/(kα+(1−δ)k−k0−¯ c)a n dv0
0(k0) on a grid of points, and we
use linear interpolation to approximate the value of these functions between
points in the grid. The decision rule for capital for points in the grid is
determined using (18). We iterate until this decision rule has approximately
converged. Thus, with this method the corresponding version of the ﬁrst
order condition holds exactly at points in the grid (see Huggett (1993) for
further details). In practice we use a grid with 800 points evenly spaced (in
some examples we increased the number of points up to 2000). Once we
obtain the decision rule for capital, we simulate the transition towards the
steady state over 1000 periods. To compute the coeﬃcient of variation over













































































































































Figure 8: Evolution of the saving rate with CES technology.
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